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RESPONDING TO DEVELOPMENTS
IN ECONOMICS AND THE COURTS:
ENTRY IN THE MERGER GUIDELINES
JONATHAN B. BAKER*
I. INTRODUCTION
The 1982 Merger Guidelines,' the anniversary of which this symposium
celebrates, were preceded by Merger Guidelines issued in 1968 by Assis-
tant Attorney General Donald Turner.2 Robert A. Hammond, who
worked on the 1968 Guidelines at the Antitrust Division,3 once told me
that the Justice Department drafting team thought about every major
relevant Supreme Court antitrust decision and made sure that they could
point to a sentence that encapsulated its holding. My immediate reaction,
only partly facetious, was that if we were doing anything similar in drafting
the 1992 Merger Guidelines, 4 which I worked on while at the Antitrust
* Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American University. The author
participated in drafting the 1992 Merger Guidelines (as Special Assistant to the Deputy
Assistant Attorney General for Economics, Antitrust Division) and in drafting the 1997
efficiency revisions (as Director of the Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission).
He is grateful to Steve Brenner, Paul Denis, Andy Gavil, Robby Robertson, and Steve Salop
for comments on an earlier draft.
I U.S. Dep't of Justice, Merger Guidelines (1982), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep (CCH)
13,102 [hereinafter 1982 Merger Guidelines].
2U.S. Dep't of Justice, Merger Guidelines (1968), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep (CCH)
13,101. Commissioner Thomas Leary of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) gives
Turner credit for "an act of considerable moral courage" in drafting guidelines that
acknowledged some limits on government discretion at a time when the government
seemingly could win any merger case it wanted. Thomas B. Leary, The Essential Stability of
Merger Policy in the United States, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 105, 109 (2002).
3Bob Hammond, my late father-in-law, served as Director of Policy Planning (similar
to Deputy Assistant Attorney General today) in the Antitrust Division from 1965 through
mid-1968, when the 1968 Merger Guidelines were issued. In June 1968 he was appointed
the equivalent of what is now termed Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General by
Assistant Attorney General Edwin M. Zimmerman. He left the Justice Department in
August 1969 and spent most of his post-government career as an antitrust partner at
Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering. Before becoming Director of Policy Planning, he had worked
on mergers at the FTC, as Chief of that agency's Division of Mergers and as an assistant
to Commissioner Philip Elman.
I U.S. Dep't ofJustice & Federal Trade Comm'n Horizontal Merger Guidelines (1992),
reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep (CCH), 13,104 [hereinafter 1992 Merger Guidelines].
These Guidelines, as revised in 1997 with respect to efficiencies, remain in force today.
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Division, it was instead to encapsulate every major article on industrial
organization economics published in the American Economic Review.
To be sure, times had changed over the intervening quarter century.
The 1968 Merger Guidelines were issued on the heels of a wave of
important Supreme Court merger decisions, including Philadelphia
National Bank,5 Alcoa (Rome Cable),6 Continental Can,
7 Consolidated Foods,8
Von's Grocery,9 Pabst,10 and Procter & Gamble." By 1992, in contrast, the
Supreme Court had been silent on merger enforcement for nearly two
decades,' 2 while economists had been developing new ideas related to
merger analysis generally, and the analysis of entry in particular. The
game theory revolution in microeconomics was well underway, and econ-
omists had begun to look at entry deterrence in strategic terms, rather
than in terms of barriers with height that could be assessed in the abstract.
One important challenge facing the drafters revising the entry section
in 1992 was thus to reconsider the old debate between "Bainian" and
"Stiglerian" barriers to entry through the lens of these then-recent devel-
opments in economics.
Although the drafters of the 1992 Merger Guidelines were not closely
parsing Supreme Court opinions, they were well aware of developments
in the case law in the lower courts. Nowhere in that drafting project
were the problems of steering between the demands of precedent and
economic logic more difficult than in writing the section on entry. The
Justice Department had just been on the losing side of two appellate
decisions refusing to enjoin mergers on grounds of ease of entry, Baker
Hughes13 and Syufy. 14 Both appellate courts had sharply criticized the
Justice Department's entry arguments and the Department's seeming
5 U.S. v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) (creating presumption of anticom-
petitive effect based on market concentration).
6 U.S.v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 377 U.S. 271 (1964) (Rome Cable).
7 U.S. v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964).
8 FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp. 380 U.S. 592 (1965) (highlighting reciprocal buying
concerns in conglomerate mergers).
9 U.S. v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
10 U.S. v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966).
1 FrC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568,578 (1967) (highlighting product extension
and potential competition concerns with conglomerate mergers).
12 The last major Supreme Court interpretation of Clayton Act § 7 remains United States
v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974). The Court issued substantive merger
decisions in three bank cases shortly after General Dynamics, most recently in United States
v. Citizens & Southern National Bank, 422 U.S. 86 (1975), but General Dynamics is generally
treated as the last significant substantive Supreme Court decision in the area.
13 U.S. v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F. 2d. 981 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
11 U.S. v. Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1990).
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lack of fidelity to the 1984 Merger Guidelines, 15 which were then in
force. The drafters of the 1992 Merger Guidelines understood the need
to respond to these decisions by setting forth a method of analysis that
would harmonize the Division's internal analytic approach to entry with
the judiciary's concerns.
Parts II and III of this essay examine, in turn, the economic and legal
challenges involving entry that government enforcers confronted during
the early 1990s. Part IV describes how the framework for entry analysis
of the 1992 Merger Guidelines sought to deal with those challenges.'
6
Part V evaluates how well that framework has succeeded after a decade
of experience. A brief concluding section sketches two unresolved issues
that may become more salient.
II. THE ECONOMIC DEBATE ABOUT
CONDITIONS OF ENTRY
A. BAIN VS. STIGLER
The antitrust analysis of new competition before the game theory era
was dominated by the contrasting views of two pioneering industrial
organization economists, Joe S. Bain and George Stigler, on defining
"barriers to entry."' 7 In brief overview, Bain was interested in the effect
of market structure on firm conduct and industry performance. He
emphasized the way a range of structural factors created entry barriers,
preventing new competition even when incumbents' prices exceeded
competitive levels (so might be expected to attract entry). Bain's list of
important entry barriers included absolute cost advantages of incum-
bents, product differentiation, and economies of scale (lower costs that
arise when output and sales increase).18
15 U.S. Dep't of Justice, Merger Guidelines (1984), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep (CCH)
13,103 [hereinafter 1984 Merger Guidelines].
16 For another view of the state of play of entry analysis in the merger review process
as of the time the 1992 Merger Guidelines were drafted, emphasizing the perspective of
the FTC's economics staff, see Malcolm B. Coate & James Langenfeld, Entry Under the
Merger Guidelines 1982-1992, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 557 (1993).
17 See generally Janusz A. Ordover & Daniel M. Wall, A Practical Guide to the Economics of
NewEntry, ANTITRUST, Summer 1988, at 12; GregoryJ. Werden, Network Effects and Conditions
of Entry: Lessons ftom the Microsoft Case, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 87, 97-100 (2001) (reviewing
the economic literature on "barriers to entry"). Cf Harold Demsetz, Barriers to Entry, 72
AM. EcON. REv. 47 (1982) (questioning both Bain's and Stigler's definition); Richard
J. Gilbert, Mobility Barriers and the Value of Incumbency, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 475,476-78 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989) (defining
a barrier to entry as a rent that is derived from incumbency).
1
8
JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION (1956).
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Stigler, too, was interested in the determinants of market concentra-
tion. But his approach to the question could be read as resisting the
interventionist implications of Bain's analysis of entry barriers. Some of
Stigler's fire was directed at the claim that high capital requirements
could prevent new competition when incumbents were exercising market
power. 19 He questioned the once common appeal to "imperfections-in-
the-capital-market" by asking whether even large capital requirements
would stand in the way of a firm seeking to finance a reasonable entry
plan, given the wide range of well-funded participants in financial and
credit markets.
20
In analyzing entry, as elsewhere in Chicago School critiques of struc-
tural era antitrust, 21 Stigler suggested that many practices previously
thought harmful to competition in fact reflected healthy competition.
He defined entry barriers as the additional long-run costs that "must be
borne by a firm which seeks to enter an industry but [are] not borne
by firms already in that industry."2 2 This definition might include the
possibility, of great concern to Chicago School antitrust commentators,
that entry would be prevented by regulation, patents, tariffs, or other
government action. But if incumbents obtained an advantage over
entrants by being first to make expenditures that entrants would need
to replicate in order to compete, or if the market could not support
multiple firms at the scale needed to achieve low costs, those advantages
should merely be seen as an appropriate reward that competition pro-
vides to the incumbent, which had the foresight or luck to enter first.
Stigler's definition of entry barriers thus excluded multiple factors
that Bain had suggested might inhibit new competition when incumbent
firms were charging prices above the competitive level. Scale economies
19 GEORGE STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 113-22 (1968).
20 Many modem commentators follow Stigler's lead in suggesting that capital markets
generally work well enough so as to permit entrants to obtain financing for plausible entry
plans without penalty relative to financing costs borne by incumbents. But others question
whether financial markets invariably work this well, citing adverse selection and moral
hazard problems endemic to capital markets that may limit the availability of capital and
thus make it difficult for worthy firms to convince lenders of the promise of their entry
plans. See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect
Information, 71 Am. ECON. REv. 912 (1983). Capital market imperfections could, for exam-
ple, make predatory pricing aviable strategy. Patrick Bolton,Joseph F. Brodley & Michael H.
Riordan, Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and LegalPolicy, 88 Geo. L.J. 2239, 2285-99 (2000).
21 See generally Jonathan B. Baker, A Preface to Post- Chicago Antitrust, in POST CHICAGO
DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 60 (Roger van den Bergh, Roberto Pardolesi
& Antonio Cucinotta eds., 2002) (describing the historical evolution of U.S. antitrust
interpretation over three broad doctrinal eras).
22 GEORGE STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 67-70 (1968). Stigler's primary
interest was not in analyzing mergers, but in explaining why a firm with a large market
share is not necessarily exercising market power.
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would not count when entrants could, in principle, achieve comparably
low costs through internal growth. Product differentiation also would
not count, unless the costs of advertising, product design or other means
of achieving differentiation were higher for a new firm than for an
incumbent firm. Accordingly, Stigler's perspective on entry barriers sug-
gested a more permissive merger policy than did Bain's.
The debate between Bainian and Stilgerian perspectives on entry barri-
ers provided a critical backdrop to the Federal Trade Commission's
Echlin decision in 1985. The Commission majority noted that Stigler's
definition of entry barriers was "widely accepted in the legal and eco-
nomic communities."23 After all, the FTC majority explained, "low-cost
incumbent firms can keep prices above the competitive level as long as
those prices remain below the level that would provide an incentive to
higher-cost potential entrants... [erecting] a permanent barrier to new
entry that would allow the maintenance of supracompetitive profits for
an indefinite period of time."
4
But if Stigler won the definitional battle in Echlin, Bain won the war.
5
The Commission majority did insist that, absent a Stiglerian barrier, new
firms would enter and drive prices down to competitive levels eventually.
But they qualified severely the implication of that observation for merger
policy. "From the standpoint of the public, however, it makes a great
deal of difference whether this occurs sooner or later."2 6 Accordingly,
the FTC majority also recognized, as a second type of entry difficulty,
an "impediment to entry." 27 An impediment was defined in Bainian
terms, as "any condition that necessarily delays entry into a market for
a significant period of time, and thus allows market power to be exercised
in the interim.
28
23 Echlin Mfg. Co., 105 F.T.C. 410, 485 (1985). The dissent contested the majority's
characterization, noting that the Bain view remains an alternative providing a different
perspective from "the current 'Chicago School' economic 'State Religion' approach to
barriers to entry." Id. at 495 (Commissioner Bailey, dissenting).
24 Id. at 485-86.
25 Similarly, the Areeda treatise expressly adopts the Bainian definition of entry barriers
as the appropriate one for antitrust purposes. 2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA, HERBERT HOVENKAMP
& JOHN L. SOLOW, ANTITRUST LAw § 420a, at 57-58 & 58 n.2, §420c, at 63-64 & 64 n.23
(2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW].
26 Echlin, 105 F.T.C. at 486.
27 Id.
28 Id. For example, the FTC majority explained, if a firm must build a new plant in
order to compete, and the construction cannot be completed in less than a decade, the
industry would be characterized by a high entry impediment. Id. at 487. See also id. at 495
(Some so-called impediments "resemble Bain's barriers to entry sent to the back of the
classroom.") (Commissioner Bailey, dissenting).
2003]
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B. STRATEGIC ENTRY DETERRENCE
During the decade before the FTC decided Echlin, economists had
begun to look at entry deterrence in strategic terms. 9 This work focused
on the significance of "sunk" costs, that is, expenditures by entrants that
could not be recouped in the event the firm were later to exit. If the fixed
costs of entry are not sunk, and entrants have variable costs comparable to
those of incumbents, the market is "contestable" and performs competi-
tively regardless of market concentration among incumbent sellers.
30
But if entry requires sunk expenditures (irreversible investments), and
incumbents would be expected to react quickly to cut price in response
to entry, entry may be deterred even if the pre-entry price exceeds
competitive levels. This may occur because the prospective entrant, rec-
ognizing the prospect of post-entry competition, will not expect to earn
a contribution margin (revenues less variable costs) adequate to cover
its own sunk costs.3'
The strategic approach to understanding entry conditions offered
industrial organization economists a way to transcend the old debate
between Bain and Stigler. It explained that high fixed expenditures
by entrants could, under some circumstances, deter entry, even if the
expenditures merely mimicked costs previously borne by incumbents.
That might occur if fixed expenditures would also be sunk. The catego-
ries of fixed expenditures highlighted by Bain-including the product
29 See generally Steven C. Salop, Strategic Entry Deterrence, 69 Am. ECON. REv. 335 (May 1979)
(Papers and Proceedings); RichardJ. Gilbert, Mobility Barriers and the Value of Incumbency, in
1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 475 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig
eds., 1989).
30 WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, JOHN C. PANZAR & ROBERT D. WILLIG, CONTESTABLE MARKETS
AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1982).
31 Marius Schwartz & RobertJ. Reynolds, Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of
Industry Structure: Comment, 73 AM. EcON. REv. 488 (1983). The "slogan" resulting from
this dynamic is that barriers to exit (irreversible investments anticipated by the prospective
entrant) may create barriers to entry. Moreover, the incumbent's sunk investments may
also play a role in deterring entry by serving as a credible commitment to aggressive post-
entry competition. Janusz A. Ordover & Daniel M. Wall, A Practical Guide to the Economics
of New Entry, 2 ANTITRUST 12, 15 (1988). In theory, indeed, even small sunk expenditures
may be sufficient to protect incumbents' exercise of market power. Judith R. Gelman &
Steven C. Salop, Judo Economics: Capacity Limitation and Coupon Competition, 14 BELLJ. ECON.
315, 316 n.2 (1983); Joseph Stiglitz, Technological Change, Sunk Costs, and Competition, in
1987 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 883. However, as will be seen, the courts
and the drafters of the 1992 Guidelines act as if relatively small sunk costs create a relatively
small entry deterrent. See Robert D. Willig, Merger Analysis, Industrial Organization Theory,
and Merger Guidelines, in 1991 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON EcON. ACTIVITY (MICROECONOMICS)
281, 310-11 (the smaller the minimum viable scale and the smaller the necessary sunk costs
associated with that scale of entry, the more likely entry will cure or deter anticompetitive
incumbent pricing). Cf Gelman & Salop, supra, at 316-19 (limited sunk expenditures
may protect incumbent market power when entrants are content to stay small).
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design and advertising expenditures that often underlie product differen-
tiation, and the up-front costs of developing a large production facility-
often are irreversible to a significant extent. That is, much of the brand
reputation and product development costs may not be transferrable to
another product were the first product not to succeed, and the plant
and equipment used to produce a new product may have no other use,
so would merely be sold as scrap in the event of exit. If so, the presence
of these fixed (and sunk) expenditures may deter entry, as Bain sup-
posed. But if the same fixed expenditures would not be sunk, entry
would not be deterred, as those following Stigler suggested.
The drafting of the 1992 Merger Guidelines provided an opportunity
to incorporate this new economic learning about entry. The economic
logic of strategic entry deterrence lies behind the Guidelines' analysis
of the "likelihood" of entry.3 2 The entry likelihood section explains
that a new competitor with an entry plan requiring significant sunk
expenditures-a "committed" entrant33-would not find entry profitable
if its output would be too large for the market to absorb without depress-
ing prices further, considering the scale at which entry would take place
and the likely sales opportunities available to the new competitor 4
Moreover, those sales opportunities would be fewer if the incumbent
firms had made prior sunk investments in excess production capacity,
and in consequence would be expected to respond to new competition
by expanding their own output, driving down the market price.35
III. THE CHALLENGE POSED BY THE COURTS
The 1992 Merger Guidelines were drafted in the immediate wake of
two 1990 appeals court decisions, Baker Hughes and Syufy, that together
appeared to pose a fundamental challenge to the government's approach
to entry analysis. I have told this story in detail elsewhere,3 6 and so will
merely sketch it here.
32 1992 Merger Guidelines § 3.3.
3 If a prospective entrant's sunk costs could not be recouped within one year of the
commencement of its supply response, assuming a "small but significant and nontransitory"
price increase above the prevailing prices in the relative market, the firm would be
considered a "committed" entrant. Id. § 1.32. This test implies, as a rough rule of thumb,
that an entry plan will be considered committed if the sunk costs of entry exceed 5% of
the entrant's likely annual revenues.Janusz A. Ordover &Jonathan B. Baker, Entry Analysis
Under the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 61 ANTITRUST. L.J. 139, 140 n.3 (1992).
4 1992 Merger Guidelines § 3.3. The role played by the entrant's "minimum viable
scale" in this analysis is considered further below.
3 Id.
36 Jonathan B. Baker, The Problem with Baker Hughes and Syufy: On the Role of Entry in
Merger Analysis, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 353 (1997).
20031
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To understand the government's litigation problem, it is useful to
begin with the 1982 Merger Guidelines. Those Guidelines recognized
that easy entry trumps high concentration-that is, that a merger is
unlikely to harm competition if entry is sufficiently easy, regardless of
market concentration.37 During the mid-1980s, the courts agreed, most
importantly in the Second Circuit's 1984 decision in Waste Management.
38
These cases dealt with what the 1992 Guidelines' term "uncommitted"
entry, though the distinction between committed and uncommitted
entry, while suggested by the economic literature on strategic entry
deterrence, was as yet unknown to the courts.
3 9
Strategic considerations are not important when entry is uncommitted.
Uncommitted entry is "hit and run": any uncommitted entrant seeing a
short-term opportunity to profit by diverting output into a market would
be expected to do so, even if that profit opportunity were likely to
disappear shortly after entry. In consequence, the distinction between
whether a firm could enter and whether it would enter is not important
in analyzing uncommitted entry. But the economic literature on strategic
entry deterrence makes entry likelihood (profitability) a central question
with respect to committed entry: when entry requires significant sunk
expenditures, a firm that could enter may find it unprofitable to do so
for fear that post-entry competition would depress the price it would
receive, leaving it unable to recover its sunk investments. The distinction
between uncommitted and committed entry is important in understand-
ing the problem created for the government's merger enforcement pro-
gram by the Justice Department's litigation losses in Baker Hughes and
Syufy.40
Baker Hughes and Syufy both involved unsuccessful Justice Department
challenges to mergers, where both the district court and the appellate
3 1982 Merger Guidelines § III.B.
38 U.S. v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 743 F.2d 976, 978, 983-84 (2d. Cir. 1984). Accord, U.S. v.
Calmar Inc., 612 F. Supp. 1298, 1306 (D.N.J. 1985); Echlin, 105 F.T.C. at 479 (opinion of
the Commission).
39 The 1982 Merger Guidelines (and the similar 1984 Merger Guidelines) had incorpo-
rated a distinction between production substitution and entry based on the absolute cost
and speed of entry. That distinction was a predecessor to the distinction made in the 1992
Merger Guidelines between uncommitted and committed entry, but it was rooted more in
Bainian entry barrier thinking than strategic considerations. The 1992 Merger Guidelines
reformulated the definitions to recognize the importance of sunk investments in creating
strategic entry deterrence. Compare 1992 Merger Guidelines § 1.32 (firms that participate
in the relevant market through supply response), with 1982 Merger Guidelines § II.B.1
(production substitution).
10 It may help newcomers to this terminology to think of committed entrants as having
made commitments to a particular relevant market through their irreversible investments. In
contrast, uncommitted entrants can switch production across markets cheaply and quickly.
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court found for the merging firms on grounds of ease of entry. Both
decisions were highly critical of government antitrust enforcers. The
D.C. Circuit decision in Baker Hughes "reads like an exasperated effort
to rein in a runaway agency thought to have willfully ignored the teaching
of Waste Management."4' The court rejected the government's contention
that entry must be "quick and effective" to count, on the ground that
this requirement overlooks the way potential competition never resulting
in actual entry can nevertheless exert competitive pressure on a market.42
The Ninth Circuit, in Syufy, also employed strong rhetoric. The court
suggested that it should have been obvious that entry was easy in the
industry in which the merger occurred, and concluded that the govern-
ment's position on entry was based on "a shopworn argument we had
thought long abandoned: that efficient, aggressive competition is itself
a structural barrier to entry."43
Both courts appear to have misunderstood what the government
argued. In each case, the government made an entry likelihood argument
rooted in the economic literature on strategic entry deterrence. In
arguing for an injunction against the merger reviewed in Baker Hughes,
the government highlighted facts suggesting that entry would require
significant sunk investments to create a reputation for product quality
and reliable future service.' In Syufy, the Justice Department contended
that entry at a scale large enough to achieve low costs would turn out
to be unprofitable because entry at that scale would depress market
prices.45 While the government was making arguments about committed
entry, however, that point was not understood by the courts. In both
cases, the appeals court viewed the trial record as establishing that entry
should be viewed as uncommitted (not involving significant time or sunk
expenditures) 46 and easy. In each, in short, the court's exasperation with
the government grew out of a misunderstanding: the court believed,
41 Baker, supra note 36, at 368.
12 Id. at 388. The court also rejected the "quick and effective" test on the ground that
it could not be applied in practice without effectively, and inappropriately, imposing on
defendants the burden of proving that entry actually will occur. Id. at 387.
43 Syufy, 903 F.2d at 667. The Syufy opinion, with its pointed comments about the dangers
of aggressive antitrust enforcement "by government bureaucrats pursuing their notions
of how the market should operate," id. at 673, could fairly be read, as two mainstream
commentators described it when it was issued, as "exud[ing] antipathy for merger enforce-
ment." Stephen Calkins & Frederick Warren-Boulton, The State of Antitrust in 1990,
Paper Presented at Cato Institute Conference, A Century of Antitrust: The Lessons, The
Challenges (Apr. 1990).
44 Baker, supra note 36, at 367 (analyzing Justice Department brief).
41 Id. at 367-70 (analyzing Justice Department brief and oral argument).
4 1992 Merger Guidelines § 1.32. My use of the term "uncommitted" in this context is
anachronistic. The term was not introduced until the 1992 Merger Guidelines, although
2003]
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incorrectly, that the Justice Department was ignoring Waste Management
and its own Merger Guidelines4 7 in refusing to accept that easy entry
precluded the possibility of competitive harm from merger.
4
8
The resulting challenge for the drafters of the 1992 Merger Guidelines
was to explain clearly the significance of the distinction between commit-
ted and uncommitted entry. If courts could not be convinced to make
that distinction, they would not undertake to analyze the profitability of
entry, and would instead wrongly limit their analysis to whether entry
could occur. The Antitrust Division front office had worked out a new
articulation in late 1989, 49 even before Baker Hughes and Syufy were
decided. They discarded the "quick and effective" terminology rejected
in Baker Hughes for the "timeliness, likelihood, and sufficiency" concepts
that later appeared in the 1992 Merger Guidelines to test whether com-
mitted entry would counteract or deter a competitive problem. 0 But it
was left to the Guidelines to spell out specifically how these concepts,
particularly entry likelihood, would be assessed in practice.
51
IV. DRAFTING THE ENTRY SECTION
The demands on the drafters of the entry section of the 1992 Merger
Guidelines went beyond the need to resolve these economic and legal
the concepts of committed and uncommitted entry were understood when these cases
were litigated and highlighted by the government's entry argument.
17 At the time these cases were decided, theJustice Department's 1984 Merger Guidelines,
which were similar on entry to the 1982 Merger Guidelines, were in force.
48 Baker, supra note 36, at 365-71.
49 Judy Whalley, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Address Before the 29th Annual
Antitrust Seminar, Practising Law Institute 12 (Dec. 1, 1989). See alsoJudy Whalley, Depart-
ment ofJustice MergerEnforcement, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 109,111-14 (1988) (Justice Department
rejects Stiglerian entry barrier definition in favor of an analysis of whether entry would
be timely, effective, and economically desirable).
50 1992 Merger Guidelines § 3 (committed entry would prevent harm to competition
from merger "if entry would be timely, likely, and sufficient in its magnitude, character
and scope to deter or counteract the competitive effects of concern."). The similarity
between the "quick and effective" language rejected in Baker Hughes and the "timely, likely,
and sufficient" language of the 1992 Merger Guidelines could have created a litigation
problem for the government, as "[a] court already persuaded that government enforcers
are out of control could read this language as a direct challenge to judicial authority by
unrepentant agencies." Baker, supra note 36, at 373. To date, however, this fear has
not materialized.
51 The FTC had begun to recognize the strategic entry deterrence logic in its case law
before 1992. In B.F. Goodrich Co., 110 F.T.C. 207 (1988), the Commission concluded
that it was unlikely that an entrant could secure an efficient level of sales "without provoking
a substantial response from incumbent firms, thereby driving prices to lower levels." Id.
at 302. The FTC also noted that the entry-deterring effects of scale economies are accentu-
ated when the investment in new plant would be substantially sunk. Id. at 302. But strategic
entry deterrence was not emphasized in the opinion, which focused on timeliness. Cf.
Coate & Langenfeld, supra note 16, at 577 (as of 1992, strategic entry deterrence arguments
[Vol. 71
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debates. One reason the 1982 Merger Guidelines had been so successful
is that they were "fully specified."5 2 However difficult the Guidelines
might be to apply in practice, they avoided conceptual ambiguities to
the extent possible, and they sought to maintain logical consistency.
5 3
With respect to uncommitted entry, the approach of the 1992 Merger
Guidelines was similar to that taken in 1982 and reaffirmed in its essentials
in 1984. All three sets of Guidelines include in the market firms that do
not participate at current prices, but that could do so quickly and cheaply
in the event prices were to rise slightly, and assign those firms a market
share based upon the production capacity they would profitably divert
into the market under such circumstances. 4 But it was more difficult to
meet the goal of fully specifying the Guidelines, and in particular, to
solve the problem of ensuring logical consistency, when it came to setting
forth an approach for assessing the likelihood of committed entry.55
In addressing the likelihood of committed entry, the drafters of the
1992 Merger Guidelines identified a logical consistency problem with
were rarely addressed in the courts and even when they were, "the explanations appear
incomplete").
5 2 William Blumenthal, Clear Agency Guidelines: Lessons from 1982, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 5,
16 (2000). "Not only did the Guidelines fill in the interstices, but they filled in virtually
all of the interstices-and generally not with abstract standards, but with numbers." Id.
'3 The goals of fully specifying the Guidelines' methodology and assuring its logical
consistency in part reflect an economic theorist's aesthetic. These considerations were
particularly important to the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Economics, Robert
D. Willig, who had been asked by Assistant Attorney General James Rill, along with lawyer
Paul Denis, Counselor to the Assistant Attorney General, to lead the drafting effort that
led to the 1992 Merger Guidelines. (I served as Special Assistant to Willig and to his
successor, Janusz Ordover. Willig and Denis asked me to work with them on producing
a draft that would be consistent with Rill's broad policy charge. Many others at the Antitrust
Division, the FTC, and outside the agency participated in reviewing and modifying the
draft we produced.)
14 Compare 1992 Merger Guidelines § 1.32 (firms that participate in the relevant market
through supply response), with 1982 Merger Guidelines § II.B.1 (production substitution)
and 1984 Merger Guidelines § 2.21 (same). See generally Ordover & Baker, supra note 33,
at 140-41 (describing 1992 Merger Guidelines treatment of uncommitted entry). The
1992 Merger Guidelines refine the concept of production substitution, however, in light
of the economic literature on strategic entry deterrence, by predicating the identification
of uncommitted entry on the absence of significant sunk expenditures. See Willig, supra
note 31, at 305-11 (interpreting the distinction between production substitution and entry
in the 1984 Merger Guidelines in terms of game theoretic approaches involving sunk
costs and commitment from industrial organization economics).
1- The 1992 Merger Guidelines did not propose an elaborate analytical framework for
the other two concepts in committed entry analysis, timeliness and sufficiency. Entry is
considered timely only if significant market impact can be achieved within two years of
initial planning, except that the period may be extended in a durable goods market where
buyers may make investments to extend an existing product's useful life. 1992 Merger
Guidelines § 3.2. This is essentially "an intertemporal sufficiency requirement," as entry
will not be sufficient if delayed. Ordover & Baker, supra note 33, at 145 n.23. Sufficiency
20031
ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL
the approach taken in 1982 and 1984. In economic theory, logical consis-
tency is achieved by ensuring that a description of market outcomes is
an equilibrium model. But the older approach could not be an equilib-
rium. 56 The earlier Guidelines had evaluated the profitability of entry
assuming that the merger led to a small increase in price lasting for a
substantial period of time.5 7 Yet an entrant that makes significant irrevers-
ible investments, and thus plans to remain in the relevant market, does
not evaluate the profitability of entry at an elevated price that might
occur through the short-term exercise of market power before entry
competes away that power. Rather, the committed entrant evaluates the
profitability of entry at the long-run post-entry price, which is the price
it expects to receive. It will thus consider the extent to which its entry,
the concomitant addition to industry output, and the likely reaction of
incumbents will reduce the long-run post-entry price below a pre-entry
price reflective of incumbent seller market power.
At what price should the profitability of committed entry be tested in
merger analysis? The 1992 Merger Guidelines provided a then-novel and
logically consistent answer. Committed entry is in for the long haul. If
the committed entry solves the competitive problem, the post-merger
price will quickly return to a level no higher than the premerger price.
Thus, the prospective committed entrant must determine whether its
entry plan would be profitable assuming it would receive no more than
the premerger price, not an elevated price reflective of short-run mar-
ket power.
But if entry at premerger prices would be profitable after the transac-
tion, why would it not have been profitable before, leading the new firm
to have entered already? The 1992 Merger Guidelines also answer this
question.58 The market after the merger is not the same as the market
before: if the merger generates market power, price is higher and output
lower than it was premerger, thus creating additional sales opportunities
for an entrant beyond what had been available prior to the merger, and
creating the possibility that entry may be profitable after the merger
even if it had not been profitable before.
comes into play if incumbents can limit entrant access to key assets required for entry,
or if sales opportunities are localized within the market. 1992 Merger Guidelines § 3.4.
6 Cf. Comments and Discussion, 1991 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON EcON. ACTIVITY (MICROECO-
NOMIcS) 313, 314 (comment by Steven C. Salop explaining why "the theory of entry
underlining the [ 1984] guidelines does not satisfy modem industrial organization theory").
5 1982 Merger Guidelines § III.B; 1984 Merger Guidelines § 3.3.
5 See generally Willig, supra note 31, at 305-11. Although this article refers to the then-
current 1984 Merger Guidelines, it was written by a primary author of the 1992 Merger
Guidelines while the drafting of those later guidelines was well underway.
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Will the additional sales opportunity resulting from a potentially anti-
competitive merger be sufficient to make entry profitable? That depends
on the extent to which the entry itself will depress price, by increasing
market output directly and by inducing pricing and output responses
from incumbent sellers. The 1992 Merger Guidelines provide a fully
specified method of assessing the profitability of entry under such cir-
cumstances. They compare an entrant's "minimum viable scale" 59-its
break-even annual sales at premerger prices,6° often expressed as a frac-
tion of industry annual sales-with an estimate of the sales opportunities
facing the entrant after the merger. As a rule of thumb, the Guidelines
suggest that an entry plan may not be plausible if the minimum viable
scale exceeds 5 percent of total market sales.
61
V. EVALUATING THE GUIDELINES' ENTRY FRAMEWORK
How has the framework for entry analysis set forth in the 1992 Merger
Guidelines fared over the following decade? Its greatest success has
probably been in clarifying the relevant issues conceptually. The distinc-
tion between committed and uncommitted entry is a basic implication
of the modem (strategic) microeconomic analysis of entry conditions.
So, too, are the key economic ideas embedded in entry likelihood analy-
sis: that new competition can be deterred by the prospect that price will
fall with entry, and that incumbents can engineer such a situation by
making commitments to post-entry competition.
The enforcement agencies no longer habitually lose merger challenges
on grounds of ease of entry,62 and this change of fortune may to some
5 9The concept of minimum viable scale had been introduced in Steven C. Salop,
Measuring Ease of Entry, 31 ANTITRUST BULL. 551 (1986). The 1992 Merger Guidelines
adopted a slightly different definition.
60 1992 Merger Guidelines § 3.3. All categories of costs are included in the analysis,
including an appropriate rate of return on invested capital given that entry could fail and
sunk costs would then be lost. The Guidelines further explain that "[t] he minimum viable
scale of an entry alternative will be relatively large when the fixed costs of entry are large,
when the fixed costs of entry are largely sunk, when the marginal costs of production are
high at low levels of output, and when a plant is underutilized for a long time because
of delays in achieving market acceptance." Id. § 3.3 n.31.
61 Id. § 3.3. The 5% benchmark for sales opportunities is adjusted to account for factors
like expected market demand growth or decline, the extent of vertical integration or
forward contracting by incumbents, and the likely output response of incumbents in
reaction to entry. Id. Cf David T. Scheffman & Pablo T. Spiller, Buyers' Strategies, Entry
Barriers, and Competition, 30 ECON. INQUIRY 418 (1992) (role of large buyers in creating
sales opportunities for entrants); GregoryJ. Werden & Luke M. Froeb, The Entry-Inducing
Effects of Horizontal Mergers: An Exploratory Analysis, 46 J. INDUS. EcON. 525 (1998) (5%
benchmark may be too high when the competitive effects theory is unilateral).
62 For example, merging firms' entry defenses were unsuccessful in FTC v. Staples, Inc.,
970 F. Supp. 1066, 1086-87 (D.D.C. 1997), and FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp.
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extent be attributed to the Guidelines' success in articulating the distinc-
tion between committed and uncommitted entry and explaining why
the difference matters. Thus, the district court in Cardinal Health directly
followed the 1992 Merger Guidelines by evaluating separately whether
(committed) entry would be timely, likely, and sufficient to solve the
competitive problem, concluding that it would not mainly on the ground
of insufficiency.63 Similarly, in Staples the district court found a way to
harmonize the entry analysis of Baker Hughes, which formally controls in
the D.C. Circuit, with the standards of the 1992 Merger Guidelines by
asking as the primary test whether new competition "would avert the
merger's anticompetitive effects." 64 The use of "would" in preference to
"could" in this articulation can be read as calling for a profitability
analysis, as suggested by the Guidelines' entry likelihood test.
Another indicator of the success of the entry framework established in
1992 is its spread to doctrinal areas beyond mergers. 65 The enforcement
agencies have themselves adapted entry standards from the Merger
Guidelines to the context of analyzing agreements among rivals.6 Some
courts have done likewise, including the Ninth Circuit in Rebel Oil, 67 a
monopolization case. That court recognized that entry, though easy for
some firms, may be insufficient to solve a competitive problem "if the
market is unable to correct itself despite the entry of small rivals" and
cited the Merger Guidelines' "timely, likely, and sufficient" language as
persuasive authority for undertaking that analysis.68
2d 34, 54-58 (D.D.C. 1998). But see U.S. v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp.
121, 149 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
6 Cardinal Health, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 54-58.
64 Staples, 970 F. Supp. at 1086 (quoting Baker Hughes, 908 F.2d at 989).
65 The Merger Guidelines contemplate a prospective analysis of competitive effects,
consistent with the procedural posture of most merger investigations. The Guidelines ask
whether entry would likely prevent harms to competition from occurring in the future.
If a Sherman Act allegation involves a claim that harm to competition took place in the
past, in contrast, a court evaluating entry would instead be expected to conduct a retrospec-
tive inquiry, such as by examining whether past entry had fully counteracted the exercise of
market power. But if the Sherman Act allegation involves prospective harm, the Guidelines'
analysis of entry could be applied directly.
6 Federal Trade Comm'n & U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations
Among Competitors § 3.35 (2000), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,161. Similarly,
the Areeda treatise treats timeliness, likelihood and sufficiency of entry as general criteria
for entry analysis, by implication not limited to the merger context. AREEDA, ANTITRUST
LAw, supra note 25, § 422.
67 Rebel Oil Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421 (9th Cir. 1995).
68 Id. at 1440. Another example of a court relying on the entry framework from the
1992 Merger Guidelines outside the merger context comes from the recent district court
decision in the government's Sherman Act case against Visa and MasterCard. U.S. v. Visa
U.S.A., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 322, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), supplemented, 183 F. Supp. 2d 613
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But the Guidelines' entry section has been criticized. FrC Commis-
sioner Thomas Leary recently raised two concerns that may be shared
by others: (1) that the agencies never find uncommitted entry (calling
it as "elusive as the Abominable Snowman"), and (2) that the methodol-
ogy for evaluating committed entry is impractical given the limits of
reasonably available information (and the "human patience and capabil-
ity to balance" any existing data). 69 The first of these criticisms may
actually reflect the Merger Guidelines' success in educating enforcement
agency staff and outside counsel about the distinction between com-
mitted and uncommitted entry. When a merger takes place in a market
in which entry requires little in the way of sunk investments or time,
and the number of prospective entrants are not limited, the agency likely
recognizes the situation right away and allows the merger to proceed
without the need for an extensive investigation. It is unlikely, for example,
that a merger among firms packaging into kits replacement parts used
to tune-up automobile carburetors, the business at issue in Echlin, would
draw a second request today.70 Under such circumstances, it is unlikely
that a current FTC Commissioner would be asked to review personally
an uncommitted entry case.
The second criticism, that the Guidelines' approach is impractical,
appears aimed mainly at the Merger Guidelines' methodology for assess-
ing entry likelihood. This criticism raises a fair issue, but it is important
to put it into perspective. When the agencies conclude that committed
entry would not solve the competitive problem from merger, they usually
do so on grounds of untimeliness or insufficiency. 71 Investigations that
turn on entry likelihood are not common, and litigation over entry
likelihood is rarer still.
Moreover, the Guidelines' drafters were aware that mathematical preci-
sion in the application of concepts like "minimum viable scale" and
"sales opportunities" would often prove elusive, notwithstanding the
(S.D.N.Y. 2001), stay granted, 2002-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,586 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), appeal
docketed, No. 02-6074 (2d Cir. Apr. 2002).
69 Leary, supra note 2, at 121. Commissioner Leary emphasizes the limited scope of his
criticism by going on to suggest that "disputes in the real world of merger enforcement
take place 'between the 45-yard lines'" and thus "are not disputes over the fundamental
direction of antitrust enforcement."
70 The enforcement agency would likely find, in a preliminary investigation obviating a
second request, that component manufacturing capability was not required to obtain the
parts, kit assembly did not require much technological know-how, and brand loyalty was
not an important factor in the sale of carburetor kits. See Echlin, 410 F.T.C. at 459 (initial
decision, findings of fact 220-22).
71 Sufficiency of entry is often an important issue in evaluating whether new competition
would solve a unilateral competitive effects problem arising from a merger among sellers
of differentiated products. When competition is localized, an entrant's ability to deter or
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underlying conceptual rigor. That does not render the concepts useless.
They still can focus the inquiry on the relevant factors that determine
whether committed entry would be profitable in the post-merger market
environment, and frame the qualitative testimony of those with actual
entry experience in the industry.72 Indeed, in my experience, this is
how the entry likelihood approach has been employed in those few
investigations in which the profitability of committed entry is central,
regardless of whether quantitative evidence is available.
73
In any case, there may be no good alternative to the entry likelihood
methodology of the 1992 Merger Guidelines. Commissioner Leary sug-
gests that the agencies apply a test based on the "history of entry or non-
entry" and whether "special circumstances ... affect the probative and
predictive value of this history." 74 But evidence that entry has occurred
in the past may be double-edged, consistent with either low entry barriers
in the past (which permitted it) or the past exercise of market power
(which induced it).75 Similarly, the absence of past entry could be consis-
tent either with a competitive market or entry barriers.
76
Accordingly, if the implications of past entry history are assessed
responsibly, doing so will almost necessarily lead to the analytic approach
of the 1992 Merger Guidelines. The Guidelines explain that recent
examples of entry, whether successful or unsuccessful, may provide a
useful starting point for identifying the necessary actions, time require-
ments, and characteristics of possible entry alternatives.77 But past entry
counteract a post-merger price rise will typically depend on the characteristics of its product
or its geographic location.
72 For example, "[industry witnesses who believe an entrant would need a minimum
market share to break even post-merger can be asked to explain why the share is so low
or high. Such witnesses can also discuss the extent of the price depression that could be
expected to follow entry at a particular scale." Ordover & Baker, supra note 33, at 145.
73 For example, in one investigation conducted when I was Director of the FTC's Bureau
of Economics, an effort to quantify minimum viable scale led the staff economist to identify
the importance of understanding limitations on prospective entrant production capacity.
This issue then became a focus of the investigation.
74 Leary, supra note 2, at 121.
7- Ordover and Wall argue that if the market has experienced "a reasonable amount"
of entry and exit in response to market signals like price fluctuations or changes in cost,
then "the plausible inference can usually be made that conditions of entry and exit do
not unduly favor incumbent firms over potential entrants." Ordover & Wall, supra note
17, at 13. But they also note that entry under such conditions "does not necessarily prove
the absence of barriers" because the market may not be behaving competitively, "thus
creating opportunities for entrants that should not be there." Id.
76 Id. at 13-14; Cardinal Health, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 57.
77 1992 Merger Guidelines § 3.1.
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evidence must be analyzed with care to ensure that it is probative.78 Can
entrants today employ the same approaches as had been successful in
the past? Can they do so as cheaply as did the earlier entrants? Would
entrants today reasonably expect to receive as high a price as did their
predecessors, who may have entered when there was less post-entry
competition or the market was larger? As these questions suggest, careful
analysis of the probative value of past examples of committed entry will
quickly turn into an entry likelihood analysis, following the approach of
the Merger Guidelines.
VI. TWO UNRESOLVED ISSUES
The 1992 Merger Guidelines framework for entry analysis continues
to embody the best current economic thinking. Still, two unresolved
issues in its application may increase in salience. The first is an economic
question not fully addressed in 1992. If entry is deterred by the prospect
of post-entry competition, it is important to understand how aggressively
market participants would compete in the event a new firm were to
enter. The 1992 Merger Guidelines recognize this point, treating the
issue as a reason that the "sales opportunities" facing the entrant may
be larger or smaller than 5 percent of total market sales, the benchmark
against which an estimate of minimum viable scale is tested in entry
likelihood analysis. 79 But the Guidelines offer no guide for thinking
about how to adjust sales opportunities for the likely output response
of incumbents in reaction to merger and entry, perhaps of necessity
because the issue is closely related to the analysis of the likely competitive
effects of the transaction.
80
The second unresolved issue is a legal question involving burdens
of proof. The Merger Guidelines disclaim allocation of burdens; they
78 For example, in monopolization cases, where the alleged harm to competition is more
often retrospective than in merger analysis, it may be possible to test the extent of past
entry successes and any accompanying price reductions for consistency with the plaintiff's
allegations. See, e.g., Tops Mkts., Inc. v. Quality Mkts., Inc., 142 F.3d 90, 99 (2d Cir. 1998)
(inferring ease of entry inconsistent with monopolization allegation from prior examples
of firms entering with seemingly little difficulty).
19 1992 Merger Guidelines § 3.3.
80 For example: if he competitive effects theory is coordinated, would the entrant be
expected to join the cartel or undermine it? If the competitive effects theory is unilateral,
would the premerger oligopoly interaction (such as Bertrand-Nash or Cournot-Nash con-
duct) be expected to change following merger and entry? Nor do the Guidelines articulate
a way to adjust sales opportunities for the other relevant factors they note, including
expected demand growth or decline, the exclusionary effect of vertical integration or
forward contracting by incumbents, or entrants' ability securely to divert sales from incum-
bents through forward contracting with buyers.
2003]
ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL
describe an analytic framework adopted by the enforcement agencies,
not a legal framework that should be employed by a court.81 But the
Guidelines have informed the case law, even in non-merger litigation.
8 2
Courts applying the Philadelphia National Bank83 presumption of anticom-
petitive effect from market concentration generally address entry as a
rebuttal factor, designed to respond to the government's showing of
concentration.8 4 This approach clearly places a burden of production
on defendant, but it may or may not place on defendant the burden of
persuasion to prove that entry would solve a competitive problem arising
from an acquisition. 8 This issue awaits clarification in further litigation.
VII. CONCLUSION
In the two decades since the publication of the 1982 Merger Guide-
lines, the federal enforcement agencies have refined the Guidelines
entry analysis to incorporate developments in industrial organization
economics and to clarify concepts that were not well understood by the
courts, thereby making the Guidelines more valuable to practitioners,
courts, and the agencies themselves. Further evolution of the framework
for entry analysis will undoubtedly occur as accumulated experience,
new economic learning, and judicial decisions provide the agencies with
more insight into analyzing sales opportunities, allocating burdens of
proof, or other issues that emerge in agency practice and litigation.
81 1992 Merger Guidelines § 0.1.
82 See supra notes 62-68 and accompanying text.
83 U.S. v. Philadelphia Nat'i Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
I See, e.g., U.S. v. Waste Mgt., Inc., 743 F.2d 976 (2d. Cir. 1984); U.S. v. Baker Hughes
Inc., 908 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
81 For example, the Areeda treatise concludes that "[t] he cases are generally, but not
absolutely, consistent" with its recommendation that courts shift the burden to the defen-
dant "to show that entry will dissipate any likely anticompetitive effects" in certain situations
placing "very strong claims for reassignment of the burden with respect to entry barriers"
including mergers to monopoly, a dominant firm's acquisition of a nascent rival, and
mergers raising concentration substantially and to high levels. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW,
supra note 25, § 941h. The treatise does not distinguish sharply between burdens of
persuasion and production, however, and could be read to suggest that both be assigned
to defendant under these circumstances but not always.
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